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Abstract 
A rational bubble cannot theoretically exist if people have infinite horizons. This paper shows 
that a bubble-like phenomenon can be generated by a “bluff” even if people are rational and 
have infinite horizons. A bluff is defined as the behavior of an agent who pretends to possess 
private information to gain profits, particularly (false or misleading) information that the 
representative household’s rate of time preference (RTP RH) has changed. An alternative 
definition of the representative household indicates that households must ex ante generate an 
expected RTP RH to behave optimally, but the expected RTP RH has to be generated based on 
beliefs about the RTP RH. Bluffers exploit the opportunities derived from the fragile nature of 
the expected RTP RH. The driving force behind bluffs is greed because bluffers do not work 
hard to gain profits by producing and selling better goods and services more cheaply, but by 
disseminating contaminated information, or acting in such a way to mislead people into 
believing the expected RTP RH has changed. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Great Recession that occurred in the latter half of the 2000s forced us to once again realize 
the importance of the economic phenomenon known as a “bubble”. In this case, it was not only 
a single commodity’s bubble that burst but a global bubble-led economic boom. Theoretically, a 
rational bubble cannot exist if agents have infinite horizons (Blanchard and Watson, 1982; 
Santos and Woodford, 1997). Hence, an economic boom led by a rational bubble is also 
impossible if agents have infinite horizons. An assumption of some kind of irrationality may 
therefore be necessary to explain the existence of bubble-like phenomena. However, merely 
making ad hoc assumptions of irrational agents does not appear to be a compelling argument. It 
is too easy to ad hoc assume irrationality because, if we assume irrationality in human behaviors, 
we can explain any otherwise unexplainable human phenomena. However, there is another 
possible source of this bubble-like phenomenon. If some factor or factors obstruct agents’ 
rational decision making, a bubble may be generated. In this paper, I show that a mechanism 
which I call a “bluff” is such a factor, and it generates a bubble-like phenomenon even if people 
are rational and have infinite horizons. In this context, I consider a bluff to be a strategy or trick 
in which an agent pretends to possess private information that is actually untrue to gain profit. 
To the best of my knowledge, this type of strategy has not been studied as a source of 
bubble-like phenomena, but it can potentially obstruct agents’ decision making and force them 
to make non-optimal decisions ex post; in other words, people can potentially be fooled or 
cheated by an agent who bluffs. 
 I show that, by utilizing private information about the rate of time preference of the 
representative household (RTP RH), a bluffer can generate a bubble-like phenomenon. Becker 
(1980) and Harashima (2014a, b) indicate that it is not possible to assume the representative 
household as the average household in dynamic models. An alternative definition of the 
representative household is shown in Harashima (2014a, b); it entails the collective behavior of 
households under sustainable heterogeneity. This alternative definition of the representative 
household requires that each household must generate an expected RTP RH ex ante for it to 
behave optimally. However, although a household knows its own rate of time preference (RTP), 
it cannot directly observe the RTP RH. Therefore, the expected RTP RH has to be generated 
based on each household’s beliefs about the RTP RH. The expected RTP RH is therefore fragile. 
If bluffers can exploit opportunities provided by this fragility and manipulate the expected RTP 
RH, the use of bluffs can cause a bubble-like phenomenon. 
 Greed is the driving force behind bluffs. Financial crises and the ensuing economic 
crises (e.g., the Great Depression or the Great Recession) are often seen as the consequences of 
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greed. However, some people have argued that greed is an indispensable driving force of 
capitalism and therefore should not be blamed. Bluffers’ greed, however, should clearly be 
blamed for negative economic outcomes because bluffers do not work harder to obtain profits 
by producing and selling better goods and services more cheaply; rather, they gain profit by 
acting in such a way to mislead people into believing the expected RTP RH has changed. 
 
2  THE EXPECTED RTP RH 
 
2.1  An alternative definition of the representative household 
2.1.1  The definition 
As Becker (1980) and Harashima (2014a, b) indicate, it is not possible to assume the 
representative household as the average household in dynamic models. Harashima (2014a, b) 
shows an alternative definition of the representative household such that the behavior of the 
representative household is defined as the collective behavior of all households under 
sustainable heterogeneity. The reason why this alternative definition is needed and the nature of 
sustainable heterogeneity are described in detail in the Appendix. Unlike the case in which the 
representative household is assumed to be the average household, this alternatively defined 
representative household reaches a steady state in which all households satisfy all of their 
optimality conditions in dynamic models, even if households are heterogeneous. In addition, the 
alternatively defined representative household has an RTP that is equal to the average RTP as 
shown in equations (A7) and (A8) in the Appendix.1 Hence, we can assume not only a 
representative household but also that its RTP is the average rate of all households. 
 
2.1.2  Necessity of expecting RTP RH 
This alternatively defined representative household requires that each household must generate 
an expected RTP RH ex ante for it to behave optimally as shown in the Appendix (see also 
Harashima, 2014a, b). However, a problem remains. Although a household knows its own RTP, 
it cannot directly observe the RTP RH, and therefore, the expected RTP RH has to be generated 
based on its beliefs about RTP RH. Beliefs will be formed by using heuristics (a detailed 
explanation of the expected RTP RH and the heuristics used to estimate it are shown in the 
Appendix). 
 
                                                   
1 If sustainable heterogeneity is achieved with the help of government intervention, the time preference 
rate of the representative household will not be exactly equal to the average rate of time preference. 
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2.2  The path when the expected and intrinsic RTP RHs are 
different 
The alternative definition of the representative household requires sustainable heterogeneity. 
Achieving sustainable heterogeneity affects the behavior of individual households because 
sustainable heterogeneity requires that each household must consider other households’ 
optimality (as well as the behavior of the government, if necessary). This feature does not, 
however, mean that households behave cooperatively. Each household behaves autonomously 
based on its own RTP, but at the same time, its behavior is influenced by whether or not the 
other households’ optimality conditions are achieved. This consideration affects the actions a 
household takes in that it affects the choice of a household’s initial consumption. 
 Sustainable heterogeneity indicates that a household’s future path of consumption has 
to be consistent with the future path of sustainable heterogeneity. Therefore, each heterogeneous 
household sets its initial consumption such that it proceeds on the path that is consistent with the 
path of sustainable heterogeneity and eventually reaches a steady state. That is, each 
heterogeneous household sets its initial consumption counting backward from its expected 
consumption in the steady state, which is calculated based on the expected RTP RH, to its 
present consumption supposing that all the other households also set their initial consumptions 
in a similar manner. All households thereby behave autonomously in the same manner. Even if 
the expected RTP RH is not equal to the intrinsic RTP RH, all households set their initial 
consumption consistent with the steady state derived from the expected RTP RH. After setting 
the initial consumption, each heterogeneous household proceeds according to its own optimality 
conditions and eventually reaches a steady state. In the steady state, households’ capital 
accumulation stops, and production, consumption, and capital no longer change. Therefore, 
even if the expected RTP RH is not equal to the intrinsic RTP RH, the steady state is stable and 
can be kept for a long period as long as households believe that the expected RTP RH is the 
correct one. 
 This nature is important because it indicates that the economy is subject not to the 
intrinsic RTP RH but to the expected RTP RH. Even if the expected RTP RH is actually very 
different from the intrinsic RTP RH, the economy will appear to proceed quite “normally” for an 
indefinite period of time without any inconsistencies among observed economic indicators. 
Therefore, the observed economic indicators alone cannot tell us whether the expected RTP RH 
is truly identical to the intrinsic RTP RH or whether or not the current economy is in a 
bubble-like state. 
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3  BLUFF 
 
The important role of the expected RTP RH as discussed in Section 2 indicates that, if the 
expected RTP RH can be manipulated, the economy can also be manipulated. The fragility of 
the expected RTP RH (i.e., it is formed based on beliefs) indicates that there is room for an 
agent (probably a malicious agent) to manipulate the expected RTP RH, for example, by 
intentionally disseminating misleading information. 
 
3.1  Bubble 
In bubble theory, a bubble is defined as an excess of asset prices over their fundamental values 
or intrinsically useless assets that are traded at positive prices. The theory concludes that if all 
agents are rational and have infinite horizons, bubbles cannot be generated. Therefore, no 
bubble-led economic boom can exist theoretically. Hereafter, I use the term “bubble” not only to 
indicate an excess of asset prices but more broadly to include a bubble-led economic boom. An 
excess of asset prices may not always accompany an economic boom, but I focus on the cases 
where an excess of asset prices does accompany the boom.   
 Despite their theoretical impossibility, many bubble-like phenomena have been 
observed across economies and time periods. According to bubble theory, if intrinsically useless 
assets are really being traded at positive prices, the condition of rational decision making must 
be violated to some extent somewhere along the line; for example, many agents behaving as if 
they have finite horizons. However, the ad hoc assumption that agents are intrinsically irrational 
is not compelling. There is, however, another possible source of interference with rational 
decision making. If some factor or factors disturb the decision-making process, the decisions 
made will not be optimal ex post. If expectations of the future economic path are skewed or 
somehow flawed, for example, because information is incomplete and asymmetric among 
agents, intrinsically useless assets may be traded at positive prices and then a bubble-like 
phenomenon may be generated. The existence of bluffs may therefore allow the generation of 
bubble-like phenomena if the bluffers can successfully manipulate information. 
 Even if information manipulation can cause small-scale episodes of trading in 
intrinsically useless assets, can it generate economy-wide large-scale bubble-like phenomena? 
Although excesses in some asset prices may be caused through information manipulation, it 
does not necessarily follow that these excess prices will lead to an economy-wide boom. To 
generate an economy-wide boom, the manipulated information not only needs to have a very 
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large impact on the economy as a whole, but it must also not be easily detected by people. If the 
manipulation is easily detected, the effects of the manipulation will soon vanish. 
 
3.2  Bluff 
Although it may seem that there is no type of manipulation that would satisfy the conditions for 
generating the bubble-like phenomenon discussed in Section 3.1, manipulating information with 
regard to the expected RTP RH could satisfy the conditions and cause bubble-like phenomena. 
The expected RTP RH has a huge impact on the economy because it is the discount factor of 
future utilities in the expected future economy, and it is not easy for households to detect 
information manipulation merely by observing economic indicators as discussed in Section 2.  
 Bluffs can be used to intentionally manipulate the expected RTP RH. In a poker game, 
a bluff is generally a bet made by a player with an inferior hand. By analogy, a bluff herein is 
defined as the behavior of an agent who pretends to possess the (false) information that the 
intrinsic RTP RH has changed. The bluffer hopes that his actions will lead people believe the 
false information and take actions that will ultimately benefit him. The misleading actions of the 
bluffer may affect the heuristics used by people in forming their beliefs and expectations of RTP 
RH. Households may become confused by the information the bluffer has disseminated, and in 
some cases, they may believe that this false information is actually true. 
 One way of bluffing is to inject huge amounts of money into financial markets to 
make loans or buy assets that are usually regarded to be too risky to own. Episodes when such 
large amounts of money have been injected for loans or risky stocks are not rare. Examples 
include the subprime mortgage loans in the United States in the first decade of the 21st century, 
the dot-com bubble in the United States in the late 1990s, or the real estate loans by banks in 
Japan in the later 1980s. Although it remains uncertain whether these episodes were generated 
intentionally by bluffers, we can agree that during these periods financial institutions injected 
huge amounts of money into projects that have historically been viewed as quite risky. 
 As households observe such huge injections of money into highly risky projects, they 
may ask themselves why some agents are taking these actions. There are several possibilities— 
the agents may be irrational or foolish, they may be bluffing, or the expected RTP RH of many 
households has changed and therefore projects that previously were deemed to be too risky are 
no longer viewed in that way. Households judge which of these possibilities is true by using 
heuristics. However, there is no guarantee that households will always reach the correct 
conclusion. There is the possibility that at least some households will come to believe that the 
expected RTP RH of other households has really changed even though, in actuality, the 
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information has been contaminated by the bluffers, whose aim is to exploit these 
misconceptions. 
 As stated previously, if the expected RTP RH is successfully manipulated in this 
manner, its impact on the economy is huge because the RTP RH is the discount factor in 
expectations of future utilities. Even a small downward shift of the discount factor will largely 
increase the expected steady-state production and generate a bubble-like economic boom. The 
more the bluff changes people’s expected RTP RH, the larger the bubble and the expected 
payoffs to the bluffers who initiated this movement will be. No household can know the 
bluffer’s initial state of mind, and as shown in Section 2, it is not easy for households to detect 
contaminated information by observing economic indicators. As a result, the economy may 
appear to be “normal” and steady as shown in the Appendix. Hence, the bubble-like economic 
boom can continue for a long period. 
 If bluffers can successfully change households’ expected RTP RH, their “investments” 
(i.e., money used for the bluff) can yield a huge amount of profits by successfully influencing 
the sale of stocks or other financial instruments before households detect the bluff. 
 
3.3  Return on assets or RTP RH?  
Information can also be distorted by altering information about the expected future dividend. 
The present value of an asset (the non-bubble part of the price) is most simply expressed as 
 
  dtDθtE t


0
exp  
 
where θ is RTP, Dt is the return on asset in period t and E is the expectation operator. Hence, in 
addition to the expected RTP RH, contaminated information can also be used to skew future 
dividends to generate a bubble-like phenomenon. However, on average, the returns Dt are 
proportionate to the marginal returns on capital (
 
t
t
dk
kdf
), and at the steady state, 
 
θ
dk
kdf
t
t  . 
That is, the expected future stream of average returns is determined depending on the expected 
RTP RH. Bluffers may disseminate false information about expected future dividends by, for 
example pretending to possess knowledge on future technologies, but at the steady state, the 
equation 
 
θ
dk
kdf
t
t   still holds. Therefore, given the expected RTP RH, there will be little 
room for bluffers to exploit opportunities for payoffs by contaminating information about the 
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average returns on assets in the economy. Hence, the bluffer’s target manipulations will be 
limited to the expected RTP RH. 
 
3.4  Bluff conditions 
3.4.1  Conditions 
Suppose for simplicity that all bluffers are identical. Therefore, bluffers’ actions (bluffs) are 
represented by a representative bluffer (hereafter, “the bluffer”). Let π be the subjective 
payoffs of a bluff to the bluffer if the expected RTP RH is successfully manipulated. Let p 
( 10  p ) be the probability that, after observing the information the bluffer disseminated, 
households decide that the expected RTP RH has changed. If households do not believe the 
information and do not change the expected RTP RH, the bluff fails and the bluffer suffers the 
loss – π  where ππ 0 . It is assumed for simplicity that π , – π , and p are identical for any 
bluff. 
 The expected payoffs to the bluffer (Π) for a bluff is therefore 
 
  πpπpΠ  1  
   πππp                                 (1) 
 
Equation (1) indicates that, even if p is small, Π > 0 if π is sufficiently large. The variance of Π, 
σ2, is  
 
    222 ππppσ   . 
 
Because 10  p , then 02  pp , 02 σ , 
 
      022
2
 ππpp
πd
dσ
 , 
 
and 
  
    02 2
2
22
 pp
πd
σd
 . 
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In addition, because 10  p , 
 
   012
2
 ππp
dΠ
dσ
 
 
and 
 
    012 1
2
22
 p
dΠ
σd
 . 
 
Hence, a payoff curve can be drawn as the bold line on the Π–σ2 plane in Figure 1. The thin 
solid line in Figure 1 indicates the indifference curve of the bluffer that has a point of contact at 
A with the payoff curve. At point A, the bluffer undertakes a bluff. 
 For simplicity, additional assumptions are introduced. In every period, the bluffer can 
undertake one bluff because of financial constraints, and the chances of a bluff being made at 
any point on the curve in the Π–σ2 plane occur randomly. That is, in a given period, a bluff 
succeeds with the probability p if a bluff that corresponds to point A on the curve in the Π–σ2 
plane occurs. If the chances of a bluff corresponding to point A do not occur frequently and p is 
small, then a bubble-like phenomenon caused by a bluff will not necessarily be frequently 
observed. 
 In the case of a more risk averse bluffer, the shape of indifference curve will be something 
like the thin dotted line shown in Figure 1. A bluff will not be undertaken in this case because the 
bluffer’s indifference curve has a point of contact at B with the payoff curve, but at point B, payoffs 
are negative and thus the bluff is not profitable. Nevertheless, bluffers are likely to be less risk 
averse than ordinary people. Hence, the shape of the bluffer’s indifference curve will usually 
resemble the thin solid line in Figure 1 where the payoff (Π) at point A is positive. 
 
3.4.2  Initial costs 
The occurrence probability of a bubble-like phenomenon caused by a bluff will be different 
depending on the value of π  because point A varies depending on π . Suppose that p is 
identical for any π . Because  
 
   2
2
22
2 pp
πd
σd
  ,  
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as π  increases, Π decreases and   222 ππppσ  ,    ππpp
πd
dσ
 22
2
, and 
 2
2
22
2 pp
πd
σd
  increase. Therefore, when π  increases, the bold solid line shifts to the bold 
dashed line in Figure 2, and point A moves to the point A′. Π for A′ is smaller than Π for A. As 
π  increases, Π decreases and eventually becomes negative. Hence, if π is sufficiently large, 
even if the bluffer’s degree of risk averseness is very low, the bluffer will not undertake a bluff 
because the expected payoffs for a bluff are negative. Conversely, if π is sufficiently small, the 
bluffer will undertake a bluff even if the bluffer’s degree of risk averseness is relatively high. 
 
3.5  The end of a bluff 
As shown in Section 2, once a bluff succeeds, the economy proceeds “normally” and steadily on 
the path calculated based on the manipulated expected RTP RH until households detect that a 
bluff has occurred. If the bluffer can successfully continue to hide their intentions, households 
do not doubt that they are behaving optimally. Nevertheless if households detect the bluff, the 
bubble-like phenomenon will end. However, how do households detect a bluff? As Section 2 
demonstrated, the economy looks to be proceeding “normally” on a path that was expected to be 
optimal. In addition, most observed economic data are consistent with this expected optimal 
path and can be interpreted as indicating that the economy is quite normal. 
 There are two ways of detecting a bluff. First, authorized information suggesting the 
existence of the bluff may be provided by the government. Here, the supervising financial 
authority plays an important role. Unlike households, the financial authority has special powers 
of investigation. If its supervision is sufficiently prudent and extensive, it is likely that the 
authority will eventually uncover the bluff. When the financial authority perceives the existence 
of a bluff, it has the power to force the bluffer to stop bluffing and provide this information to 
households. In this sense, prudential supervision is crucially important to help households avoid 
the damages inflicted on them by bluffers. The importance of the financial authority’s 
supervision conversely indicates that, if households begin to doubt whether the authority’s 
supervision is sufficiently prudent, they may adjust the expected RTP RH largely supposing that 
the current economic boom is caused by a bluff because the supervision has failed. The bluff 
and bubble-like phenomenon will end when households begin to doubt either the supervising 
authority.  
 A second possible way of detecting a bluff is if the bluffer pushes too far because of 
greed. The bluffer may have to take on a high level of risk of being detected to obtain greater 
payoffs. The probability that the hidden intention of the bluffer will be detected by households 
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will increase as the bluffer pursues greater amounts money. A bluffer who has become 
complacent or conceited because of the success of the bluff may indeed engage in such 
high-risk behavior. This possibility appears to be likely because bluffers are quite likely to be 
greedy by nature. The bluffer does not work hard to gain profits by producing and selling better 
goods and services more cheaply, but by disseminating contaminated information. This 
behavior clearly indicates that they are intrinsically greedy. 
 When a bluff is detected, households will not only return the expected RTP RH to the 
former value, but they may go further. That is, they may generate a much higher expected RTP 
RH than the original one (before the bluff) because the credibility of the financial authority has 
been undermined and therefore future uncertainty about the economy increases. The structural 
model of RTP indicates that an increase in future uncertainty increases RTP (see the Appendix 
and Harashima, 2014a, b), so the expected RTP RH will be changed to a higher value than that 
before the bluff. The subsequent economic stagnation will worsen as compared with the case 
where the expected RTP RH simply returns to the pre-bluff value. 
 
3.6  The bluffer is not a noise trader or criminal 
Although a bubble-like phenomenon generated by a bluff is not a rational bubble as defined in 
bubble theory, it can be observed even if all agents behave rationally and have infinite horizons. 
A bubble-like phenomenon is generated not because of irrationality, but rather because of 
fragility in the belief and expectation of the RTP RH as shown in Section 2. This fragility 
provides the opportunity for bluffers. Hence, the bluffer is not a noise trader because noise 
traders are irrational and bluffers behave completely rationally. In fact, both households and 
bluffers behave quite rationally. 
 Furthermore, a bluff is not a crime in most, if not all, countries. “Pump and dump” 
stock sales are a crime in most countries because false news is intentionally disseminated to 
gain profits. Although the bluffer contaminates information similar to a pump and dump 
strategy, false news is not actually disseminated. Instead, the bluffer engages in equivocal 
behavior and confuses households, but the bluffer’s behavior itself is not false news. The 
interpretation of the bluffer’s actions is completely up to households. Even if households 
wrongly interpret them, the bluffer is not responsible for their wrong interpretation. In theory, 
confusing households could be ruled out by law, but there are many kinds of economic activities 
that have the potential to confuse households to a greater or lesser extent. It would be very 
difficult to enact a law that strictly defines a bluff, while also distinguishing it from other 
confusing activities. Bluffs therefore should not be controlled by law enforcement agencies, but 
they should be strictly and prudently supervised by the financial authority. 
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4  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Rational bubbles and economic booms led by them are not theoretically possible if agents have 
infinite horizons. However, assuming irrationality ad hoc does not appear to be a compelling 
argument. Even if people are rational and have infinite horizons, a bubble-like phenomenon can 
be generated if the expectation of the future economic path is hindered by some factors. In this 
paper, I show that bluffs are such a factor. The bluffer manipulates the household’s expected 
RTP RH by acting in such a way as to lead people to believe incorrect information. A bluffer 
can thereby generate a bubble-like phenomenon even if people are rational and have infinite 
horizons because the expected RTP RH is the discount factor that is used to determine the 
expected future economic path. 
 An example of bluff is the injection of a huge amount of money into financial markets 
to give loans or buy assets that would usually be regarded too risky. Bluffs are effective because 
each household must generate an expected RTP RH ex ante for it to behave optimally and the 
expected RTP RH has to be formed based on beliefs about RTP RH. The bluffer exploits the 
opportunity provided by the fragility of the expectation. 
 The driving force behind bluffs is greed because bluffers do not work hard to get 
profits by producing and selling better goods and services more cheaply, but by disseminating 
contaminated information or acting in such a way to mislead people. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A1  The representative household in dynamic models 
A1.1  The assumption of the representative household 
The concept of the representative household is a necessity in macroeconomic studies. It is used 
as a matter of course, but its theoretical foundation is fragile. The representative household has 
been used given the assumption that all households are identical or that there exists one specific 
individual household, the actions of which are always average among households (I call such a 
household “the average household” in this paper). The assumption that all households are 
identical seems to be too strict; therefore, it is usually assumed explicitly or implicitly that the 
representative household is the average household. However, the average household can exist 
only under very strict conditions. Antonelli (1886) showed that the existence of an average 
household requires that all households have homothetic and homogeneous utility functions. This 
type of utility function is not usually assumed in macroeconomic studies because it is very 
restrictive and unrealistic. If more general utility functions are assumed, however, the 
assumption of the representative household as the average household is inconsistent with the 
assumptions underlying the utility functions.  
 Nevertheless, the assumption of the representative household has been widely used, 
probably because it has been believed that the representative household can be interpreted as an 
approximation of the average household. Particularly in static models, the representative 
household can be seen to approximate the average household. However, in dynamic models, it 
is hard to accept the representative household as an approximation of the average household 
because, if RTPs of households are heterogeneous, there is no steady state where all of the 
optimality conditions of the heterogeneous households are satisfied (Becker, 1980). Therefore, 
macroeconomic studies using dynamic models are fallacious if the representative household is 
assumed to approximate the average household.  
 
A1.2  The representative household in static models 
Static models are usually used to analyze comparative statics. If the average household is 
represented by one specific unique household for any static state, there will be no problem in 
assuming the representative household as an approximation of the average household. Even 
though the average household is not always represented by one specific unique household in 
some states, if the average household is always represented by a household in a set of 
households that are very similar in preferences and other features, then the representative 
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household assumption can be used to approximate the average household.  
 Suppose, for simplicity, that households are heterogeneous such that they are identical 
except for a particular preference. Because of the heterogeneous preference, household 
consumption varies. However, levels of consumption will not be distributed randomly because 
the distribution of consumption will correspond to the distribution of the preference. The 
consumption of a household that has a very different preference from the average will be very 
different from the average household consumption. Conversely, it is likely that the consumption 
of a household that has the average preference will nearly have the average consumption. In 
addition, the order of the degree of consumption will be almost unchanged for any static state 
because the order of the degree of the preference does not change for the given state.   
 If the order of consumption is unchanged for any given static state, it is likely that the 
household with consumption that is closest to the average consumption will also always be a 
household belonging to a group of households that have very similar preferences. Hence, it is 
possible to argue that, approximately, one specific unique household’s consumption is always 
average for any static state. Of course, it is possible to show evidence that is counter to this 
argument, particularly in some special situations, but it is likely that this conjecture is usually 
true in normal situations, and the assumption that the representative household approximates the 
average household is acceptable in static models. 
 
A1.3  The representative household in dynamic models 
In dynamic models, however, the story is more complicated. In particular, heterogeneous RTPs 
pose a serious problem. This problem is easily understood in a dynamic model with exogenous 
technology (i.e., a Ramsey growth model). Suppose that households are heterogeneous in RTP, 
degree of risk aversion (ε), and productivity of the labor they provide. Suppose also for 
simplicity that there are many “economies” in a country, and an economy consists of a 
household and a firm. The household provides labor to the firm in the particular economy, and 
the firm’s level of technology (A) varies depending on the productivity of labor that the 
household in its economy provides. Economies trade with each other: that is, the entire 
economy of a country consists of many individual small economies that trade with each other.  
 A household maximizes its expected utility,    dtθtcuE t 

exp
0
, subject to 
 
 
  ttt ckfk  , where  u  is the utility function;  f  is the production function; θ is 
RTP; E is the expectation operator; 
t
t
t
L
Y
y  , 
t
t
t
L
K
k  , and 
t
t
t
L
C
c  ; Yt (≥ 0) is output, Kt (≥ 0) 
is capital input, Lt (≥ 0) is labor input, and Ct (≥ 0) is consumption in period t. The optimal 
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consumption path of this Ramsey-type growth model is   
 
  









  θ
k
y
ε
c
c
t
t
t
t 1

 , 
 
and at steady state, 
 
θ
k
y
t
t 


 .                              (A1) 
 
Therefore, at steady state, the heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion (ε) is irrelevant, and 
the heterogeneity in productivity does not result in permanent trade imbalances among 
economies because 
t
t
k
y


in all economies is kept equal by market arbitrage. Hence, 
heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion and productivity does not matter at steady state. 
Therefore, the same logic as that used for static models can be applied. Approximately, one 
specific unique household’s consumption is always average for any time in dynamic models, 
even if the degree of risk aversion and the productivity are heterogeneous. Thus, the assumption 
of the representative household is also acceptable in dynamic models even if the degree of risk 
aversion and the productivity are heterogeneous. 
 However, equation (A1) clearly indicates that heterogeneity in RTP is problematic. As 
Becker (1980) shows, if RTP is heterogeneous, the household that has the lowest RTP will 
eventually possess all capital. With heterogeneous RTPs, there is no steady state where all 
households achieve all of their optimality conditions. In addition, the household with 
consumption that is average at present has a very different RTP from the household with 
consumption that is average in the distant future. The consumption of a household that has the 
average RTP will initially be almost average, but in the future the household with the lowest 
RTP will be the one with consumption that is almost average. That is, the consumption path of 
the household that presently has average consumption is notably different from that of the 
household with average consumption in the future. Therefore, any individual household cannot 
be almost average in any period and thus cannot even approximate the average household. As a 
result, even if the representative household is assumed in a dynamic model, its discounted 
expected utility    dtθtcuE t 

exp
0
 is meaningless, and analyses based on it are 
fallacious.  
 15 
  If we assume that RTP is identical for all households, the above problem is solved. 
However, this solution is still problematic because that assumption is not merely expedient for 
the sake of simplicity; rather, it is a critical requirement to allow for an assumed representative 
household. Therefore, the rationale for identical RTPs should be validated; that is, it should be 
demonstrated that identical RTPs are actually and universally observed. RTP is, however, 
unquestionably not identical among households. Hence, it is difficult to accept the 
representative household assumption in dynamic models based on the assumption of identical 
RTP. 
 The conclusion that the representative household assumption in dynamic models is 
meaningless and leads to fallacious results is very important, because a huge number of studies 
have used the representative household assumption in dynamic models. To solve this severe 
problem, an alternative interpretation or definition of the representative household is needed. 
 Note that in an endogenous growth model the situation is even more complicated. 
Because a heterogeneous degree of risk aversion also matters, the assumption of the 
representative household is more difficult to accept, so an alternative interpretation or definition 
is even more important when endogenous growth models are used. 
 
A2  Sustainable heterogeneity 
A2.1  The model 
Suppose that two heterogeneous economies―economy 1 and economy 2—are identical except 
for their RTPs. Households within each economy are assumed to be identical for simplicity. The 
population growth rate is zero. The economies are fully open to each other, and goods, services, 
and capital are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each economy. 
 Each economy can be interpreted as representing either a country (the international 
interpretation) or a group of identical households in a country (the national interpretation). 
Because the economies are fully open, they are integrated through trade and form a combined 
economy. The combined economy is the world economy in the international interpretation and 
the national economy in the national interpretation. In the following discussion, a model based 
on the international interpretation is called an international model and that based on the national 
interpretation is called a national model. Usually, the concept of the balance of payments is used 
only for the international transactions. However, because both national and international 
interpretations are possible, this concept and terminology are also used for the national models 
in this paper. 
 RTP of household in economy 1 is 
1θ  and that in economy 2 is θ2, and θ1 < θ2. The 
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production function in economy 1 is  ,t
α
,t kfAy 11   and that in economy 2 is 
 ,t
α
,t kfAy 22  , where yi,t and ki,t are, respectively, output and capital per capita in economy i 
in period t for i = 1, 2; A is technology; and α  10  α  is a constant. The population of each 
economy is 
2
L
; thus, the total for both is L, which is sufficiently large. Firms operate in both 
economies. The current account balance in economy 1 is τt and that in economy 2 is –τt. The 
production functions are specified as  
 
  α
ti,
α
i,t kAy
 1  ; 
 
thus,    2,11,, 
 iALKY
αα
titi
. Because A is given exogenously, this model is an exogenous 
technology model (Ramsey growth model). The examination of sustainable heterogeneity based 
on an endogenous growth model is shown in Appendix.  
 Because both economies are fully open, returns on investments in each economy are 
kept equal through arbitration, such that  
 
,t
,t
,t
,t
k
y
k
y
2
2
1
1





 .                            (A2) 
 
Because equation (A2) always holds through arbitration, equations 
tt kk ,2,1  , tt kk ,2,1
  , 
tt yy ,2,1  , and tt yy ,2,1    also hold.  
 The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s0  mirrors capital flows between the 
two economies. The economy with current account surpluses invests them in the other economy. 
Because 













t
t
t
t
k
y
k
y
,2
,2
,1
,1  are returns on investments, dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t


0
,1
,1  and dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t


0
,2
,2  
represent income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other economy. 
Hence,  
 
dsτ
k
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t 


0
,2
,2  
 
is the balance on goods and services of economy 1, and  
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t
t
s
t
t
τdsτ
k
y



0
,1
,1  
 
is that of economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between the 
economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies, such that  
 
   ,t,tt ,kkκτ 21  . 
 
 The government (or an international supranational organization) intervenes in the 
activities of economies 1 and 2 by transferring money from economy 1 to economy 2. The 
amount of transfer in period t is gt, and it is assumed that gt depends on capital inputs, such that  
 
  ,tt
kgg 1  ,
 
 
where g  is a constant. Because tt kk ,2,1   and tt kk ,2,1
  , 
 
  
,t,tt kgkgg 21   . 
 
 Each household in economy 1 therefore maximizes its expected utility 
 
     dttθcuE t 1
0
,11 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
  ,tt
t
s
α
,t
α
,t
α
,t
α
t kgτdsτkAαckAk 1
0
11
1
1,1 1  
  ,            (A3) 
 
and each household in economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
 
     dttθcuE t 2
0
,22 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
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  tt
t
s
α
t
α
,t
α
t
α
t kgτdsτkAαckAk ,2
0
,22
1
,2,2 1  
  ,            (A4) 
 
where ui,t and ci,t, respectively, are the utility function and per capita consumption in economy i 
in period t for i = 1, 2; and E is the expectation operator. Equations (A3) and (A4) implicitly 
assume that each economy does not have foreign assets or debt in period t = 0. 
 
A2.2  Sustainable heterogeneity without government intervention 
Heterogeneity is defined as being sustainable if all of the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied indefinitely. First, the natures of the model when the 
government does not intervene (i.e., 0g ) are examined. The growth rate of consumption in 
economy 1 is 
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Hence,  
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and thereby  
 
       0111lim 11 


θΞΨαkAα α,t
α
t
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where 
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t
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τ
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τ
Ξ
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k
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, and Ψ is constant at steady state because k1,t and τt are constant; thus, 
t
t
t k
τ
Ξ
,1
lim

  is constant at steady state. For Ψ to be constant at steady state, it is necessary that 
0lim 

t
t
τ  and thus 0Ξ . Therefore,  
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      0111lim 11 
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t
 ,                 (A5) 
 
and 
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By equations (A5) and (A6),  
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 .                     (A7) 
 
If equation (A7) holds, all of the optimality conditions of both economies are indefinitely 
satisfied. The state indicated by equation (A7) is called the “multilateral steady state” or 
“multilateral state” in the following discussion. By procedures similar to those used for the 
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endogenous growth model in Appendix, the condition of the multilateral steady state for H 
economies that are identical except for their RTPs is shown as  
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for any i, where i = 1, 2, … , H.  
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by equation (A7), then by 0lim
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that is, economy 1 possesses accumulated debts owed to economy 2 at steady state, and 
economy 1 has to export goods and services to economy 2 by 
 
  dsτkAα
t
s
α
t
α


0
,11  
 
in every period to pay the debts. Nevertheless, because 0lim 

t
t
τ  and 0Ξ , the debts do 
not explode but stabilize at steady state. Because of the debts, the consumption of economy 1 is 
smaller than that of economy 2 at steady state under the condition of sustainable heterogeneity.  
 Note that many empirical studies conclude that RTP is negatively correlated with 
income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 2003). Suppose that, in addition to the 
heterogeneity in RTP (θ1 < θ2), the productivity of economy 1 is higher than that of economy 2. 
At steady state, the consumption of economy 1 would be larger than that of economy 2 as a 
result of the heterogeneity in productivity. However, as a result of the heterogeneity in RTP, the 
consumption of economy 1 is smaller than that of economy 2 at steady state under sustainable 
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heterogeneity. Which effect prevails will depend on differences in the degrees of heterogeneity. 
For example, if the difference in productivity is relatively large whereas that in RTP is relatively 
small, the effect of the productivity difference will prevail and the consumption of economy 1 
will be larger than that of economy 2 at steady state under sustainable heterogeneity.  
 
A3  An alternative definition of the representative household 
A3.1  The definition 
Section A2 indicates that, when sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, all heterogeneous 
households are connected (in the sense that all households behave by considering other 
households’ optimality) and appear to be behaving collectively as a combined supra-household 
that unites all households, as equations (A7) and (A8) indicate. The supra-household is unique 
and its behavior is time-consistent. Its actions always and consistently represent those of all 
households. Considering these natures of households under sustainable heterogeneity, I present 
the following alternative definition of the representative household: “the behavior of the 
representative household is defined as the collective behavior of all households under 
sustainable heterogeneity.” 
 Even if households are heterogeneous, they can be represented by a representative 
household as defined above. Unlike the representative household defined as the average 
household, the collective representative household reaches a steady state where all households 
satisfy all of their optimality conditions in dynamic models. In addition, this representative 
household has a RTP that is equal to the average RTP as shown in equations (A7) and (A8).2 
Hence, we can assume not only a representative household but also that its RTP is the average 
rate of all households.  
 
A3.2  Universality of sustainable heterogeneity 
An important point, however, is that this alternatively defined representative household can be 
used in dynamic models only if sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, but this condition is not 
necessarily always naturally satisfied. Sustainable heterogeneity is achieved only if households 
with lower RTPs behave multilaterally or the government appropriately intervenes. Therefore, 
the representative household assumption is not necessarily naturally acceptable in dynamic 
models unless it is confirmed that sustainable heterogeneity is usually achieved in an economy.  
 Notwithstanding this flaw, the representative household assumption has been widely 
                                                   
2 If sustainable heterogeneity is achieved with the help of the government’s intervention, the time 
preference rate of the representative household will not be exactly equal to the average rate of time 
preference. 
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used in many macroeconomic studies that use dynamic models. Furthermore, these studies have 
been little criticized for using the inappropriate representative household assumption. In 
addition, in most economies, the dire state that Becker (1980) predicts has not been observed 
even though RTPs of households are unquestionably heterogeneous. These facts conversely 
indicate that sustainable heterogeneity―probably with government interventions―has been 
usually and universally achieved across economies and time periods. In a sense, these facts are 
indirect evidence that sustainable heterogeneity usually prevails in economies.  
 Note that because the representative household’s behavior in dynamic models is 
represented by the collective behavior of all households under sustainable heterogeneity, RH’s 
RTP is not intrinsically known to households, but they do need to have an expected rate. Each 
household intrinsically knows its own preferences, but it does not intrinsically know the 
collective preference of all households. Therefore, in dynamic models, it must be assumed that 
all households do not ex ante know RH’s RTP, but households estimate it from information on 
the behaviors of other households and the government.  
 
A4  NEED FOR AN EXPECTED RTP RH 
A4.1  The behavior of household 
Achieving sustainable heterogeneity affects the behavior of the individual household because 
sustainable heterogeneity indicates that each household must consider the other households’ 
optimality (as well as the behavior of the government, if necessary). This feature does not mean 
that households behave cooperatively with other households. Each household behaves 
non-cooperatively based on its own RTP, but at the same time, it behaves considering whether 
the other households’ optimality conditions are achieved or not. This consideration affects the 
actions a household takes in that it affects the choice of a household’s initial consumption. 
 Sustainable heterogeneity indicates that a household’s future path of consumption has 
to be consistent with the future path of sustainable heterogeneity. Thereby, a household sets its 
initial consumption such that it will proceed on the path that is consistent with the path of 
sustainable heterogeneity and eventually reach a steady state. 
 
A4.2  Deviation from sustainable heterogeneity 
A4.2.1  Political elements 
What happens if a household deviates from sustainable heterogeneity? A deviation means that a 
household sets its initial consumption at a level that is not consistent with sustainable 
heterogeneity. For less advantaged households (i.e., households with higher RTPs), the only way 
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to satisfy all of their optimality conditions is to set their initial consumption consistent with 
sustainable heterogeneity. Therefore, they will not take the initiative to deviate. In contrast, the 
most advantaged households (i.e., those with the lowest RTP) can satisfy all of their optimality 
conditions even if they set initial consumption independent of sustainable heterogeneity. The 
incentive for the most advantaged household to select a multilateral path will be weak because 
the growth rate of the most advantaged household on the multilateral path is lower than that on 
the unilateral path. 
 When economy 1 selects the unilateral path, does economy 2 quietly accept the 
unfavorable consequences shown in Becker (1980)? From an economic perspective, the optimal 
response of economy 2 is the one shown in Harashima (2010): economy 2 should behave as a 
follower and accept the unfavorable consequences. However, if other factors—particularly 
political ones—are taken into account, the response of economy 2 will be different. Faced with 
a situation in which all the optimality conditions cannot be satisfied, it is highly likely that 
economy 2 would politically protest and resist economy 1. It should be emphasized economy 2 
is not responsible for its own non-optimality, which is a result of economy 1’s unilateral 
behavior in a heterogeneous population. Economy 2 may overlook the non-optimality if it is 
temporary, but it will not if it is permanent. As shown in Harashima (2010), the non-optimality 
is permanent, it is quite likely that economy 2 will seriously resist economy 1 politically.  
 If economy 1 could achieve its optimality only on the unilateral path, economy 1 
would counter the resistance of economy 2, but this is not the case. Because of this, economy 
2’s demand does not necessarily appear to be unreasonable or selfish. Faced with the protest and 
resistance by economy 2, economy 1 may compromise or cooperate with economy 2 and select 
the multilateral path. 
 
A4.2.2  Resistance 
The main objective of economy 2 is to force economy 1 to select the multilateral path and to 
establish sustainable heterogeneity. This objective may be achieved through cooperative 
measures, non-violent civil disobedience (e.g., trade restrictions), or other more violent means. 
Restricting or abolishing trade between the two economies will cost economy 1 
because it necessitates a restructuring of the division of labor, and the restructuring will not be 
confined to a small scale. Large-scale adjustments will develop that involve all levels of divided 
labor, because they are all correlated with each other. For example, if an important industry had 
previously existed only in one economy, owing to a division of labor, and trade between the two 
economies was no longer permitted, the other economy would have to establish this industry 
while also maintaining other industries. As a result, economy 1 would incur non-negligible costs. 
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More developed economies have more complicated and sophisticated divisions of labor, and 
restructuring costs from the disruption of trade will be much higher in developed economies. In 
addition, more resources will need to be allocated to the generation of technology because 
technology will also no longer be traded. Finally, all of the conventional benefits of trade will 
be lost. Trade is beneficial because of the heterogeneous endowment of resources, as the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem shows. Because goods and services are assumed to be uniform in the 
models presented in this paper, the benefits of trade are implicit in the models. However, in the 
real word, resources such as oil and other raw materials are unevenly distributed, so a disruption 
or restriction of trade will substantially damage economic activities on both national and 
international levels. 
 The damage done by trade restrictions has an upper limit, however, because the 
restructuring of the division of labor, additional resource allocation to innovation, and loss of 
trade benefits are all finite. Therefore, in some cases, particularly if economies are not 
sufficiently developed and division of labor is not complex, the damage caused will be 
relatively small. Hence, a disruption of trade (non-violent civil disobedience in the national 
models) may not be sufficiently effective as a means of resistance under some these conditions. 
In some cases, harassment, sabotage, intimidation, and violence may be used, whether 
legal or illegal. In extreme cases, war or revolution could ensue. In such cases, economy 1 will 
be substantially damaged in many ways and be unable to achieve optimality. The resistance and 
resulting damages will continue until sustainability is established. 
 In any case, the objective of economy 2’s resistance conversely implies that 
establishing sustainability eliminates the risk and cost of political and social instability. The 
resistance of economy 2 will lower the desire of economy 1 to select the unilateral path. 
 
A4.2.3  United economies 
An important countermeasure to the fragility of sustainable heterogeneity for less advantaged 
economies is the formation of a union of economies. If economies other than economy 1 are 
united by commonly selecting the multilateral path within them, their power to resist economy 1 
will be substantially enhanced. Consider the multi-economy model shown in Harashima (2010). 
If the economies do not form a union, the power to resist the unilateral actions of economy 1 is 
divided and limited to the power of each individual economy. However, if the economies are 
united, the power to resist economy 1 increases. If a sufficient number of economies unite, the 
multilateral path will almost certainly be selected by economy 1. 
 To maintain the union, any economy in the union should have the explicit and 
resolved intention of selecting the multilateral path within the union, even if it is relatively more 
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advantaged within the union. To demand that relatively more advantaged economies select the 
multilateral path, less advantaged economies themselves must also select the multilateral path in 
any case. Otherwise, less advantaged economies will be divided and ruled by more advantaged 
economies. For all heterogeneous people to happily coexist, all of them should behave 
multilaterally. At the same time, Harashima (2010) indicates that the more advantaged an 
economy is, the more modestly it should behave, i.e., the more it should restrain itself from 
accumulating extra capitals. 
 In general, therefore, the most advantaged (the lowest RTP) household will be forced 
to set its initial consumption consistent with sustainable heterogeneity. 
 
A4.3  Need for an expected RTP RH 
Because all households need to set their initial consumption consistent with sustainable 
heterogeneity to achieve it, households must calculate the path of sustainable heterogeneity 
before setting their initial consumption levels. To calculate this level, each household first must 
know the value of RTP RH. However, although a household naturally knows the value of its 
own RTP, it does not intrinsically know the value of RTP RH. To know this, a household would 
have to know the values of all of the other households’ RTPs. Hence, the expected value of RTP 
RH must somehow be generated utilizing all other relevant available information. The necessity 
of an expected RTP RH is critically important because RTP plays a crucial role as the discount 
factor in dynamic models. 
 Note that, if we assume that RTP is identical for all households, an expected RTP RH 
is no longer needed because any household’s own RTP is equal to the RTP RH. This solution is 
still problematic, however, because the assumption is not merely expedient for the sake of 
simplicity; rather, it is a critical requirement to eliminate the need for an expected RTP RH. 
Therefore, any rationale for assuming identical RTPs should be validated; that is, it should be 
demonstrated that identical RTPs do exist and are universally observed. However, RTP is 
unquestionably not identical among households. Therefore, households must use expected 
values of RTP RH. 
 
A5  THE RTP MODEL 
A5.1  Need to know the structural model  
If RTP RH is a constant parameter, as has been long and widely assumed, the need for an 
expected RTP RH would not be a serious problem. The historical mean of an unchanging RTP 
RH could be estimated relatively precisely based on long-term data of various economic 
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indicators even if the structural model remained unknown. The RTP RH could be specified as 
the RTP that is most consistent with long-term trends of the indicators. 
 Although RTP has been treated as a constant parameter in many studies, this feature 
has not been demonstrated either empirically or theoretically. Rather, the assumption is merely 
expedient for the sake of simplicity. There is another practical reason for this treatment: models 
with a permanently constant RTP exhibit excellent tractability (see Samuelson, 1937). However, 
some have argued that it is natural to view RTP as temporally variable, and the concept of a 
temporally varying RTP has a long history (e.g., Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Fisher, 1930). More 
recently, Lawrance (1991) and Becker and Mulligan (1997) showed that people do not inherit 
permanently constant RTPs by nature and that economic and social factors affect the formation 
of RTPs. Their arguments indicate that many incidents can affect and change RTP. Models of 
endogenous RTP have been presented, the most familiar of which is Uzawa’s (1968) model. 
 If the RTP RH is temporally variable, its future stream must be expected by 
households, and a rational expectation is a model-consistent expectation. To generate rational 
expectations of RTP RH, therefore, the structural model of the RTP RH (i.e., equations that 
fundamentally describe how it is endogenously formed) needs to be known. 
 
A5.2  Endogenous RTP models 
A5.2.1 Uzawa’s (1968) model 
The most well-known endogenous RTP model is that of Uzawa (1968). It has been applied in 
many analyses (e.g., Epstein and Hynes, 1983; Lucas and Stokey, 1984; Epstein, 1987; Obstfeld, 
1990). However, Uzawa’s model has not necessarily been regarded as a realistic expression of 
the endogeneity of RTP because it has a serious drawback in that impatience increases as 
income, consumption, and utility increase. The basic structure of Uzawa’s model is 
 
   tt cuθθ
  , 
 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  , 
 
in which RTP in period t (θt) is temporally variable and an increasing function of present utility 
u(ct) where ct is consumption in period t. The condition 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  is necessary for the model 
to be stable. This property is quite controversial and difficult to accept a priori because many 
empirical studies have indicated that RTP is negatively correlated with permanent income (e.g., 
Lawrance, 1991); thus, many economists are critical of Uzawa’s model. Epstein (1987), 
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however, discussed the plausibility of increasing impatience and offered some 
counter-arguments. However, his view is in the minority, and most economists support 
arguments in favor of a decreasing RTP, such that 
 
0
t
t
cdu
dθ
. Hence, although Uzawa’s model 
attracted some attention, the analysis of the endogeneity of RTP has progressed very little. 
Although Uzawa’s model may be flawed, it does not mean that the conjecture that RTP is 
influenced by future income, consumption, and utility is fallacious. Rather, it means that an 
appropriate model in which RTP is negatively correlated with income, consumption, and utility 
has not been presented. 
 
A5.2.2 Size effect on impatience 
The problem of 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  in Uzawa’s model arises because distant future levels of 
consumption have little influence on factors that form RTP; that is, RTP is formed only with the 
information on present consumption, and it must be revised every period in accordance with 
consumption growth. However, there is no a priori reason why information on distant future 
activities should be far less important than the information on the present and near future 
activities. Fisher (1930) argued that 
 
[O]ur first step, then, is to show how a person’s impatience depends on the size 
of his income, assuming the other three conditions to remain constant; for, 
evidently, it is possible that two incomes may have the same time shape, 
composition and risk, and yet differ in size, one being, say, twice the other in 
every period of time. 
 In general, it may be said that, other things being equal, the smaller the 
income, the higher the preference for the present over the future income. It is 
true of course that a permanently small income implies a keen appreciation of 
wants as well as of immediate wants. … But it increases the want for immediate 
income even more than it increases the want for future income. (p. 72) 
 
According to Fisher’s (1930) view, a force that influences RTP is a psychological response 
derived from the perception of the “size of the entire income or utility stream.” This view 
indicates that it is necessary to probe how people perceive the size of the entire income or utility 
stream. 
 Little effort has been directed toward probing the nature of the size of the utility or 
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income stream on RTP, although numerous psychological experiments have been performed 
with regard to the anomalies of the expected utility model with a constant RTP (e.g., Frederick 
et al., 2002). Analyses using endogenous RTP models so far have merely introduced the a priori 
assumption of endogeneity of RTP without explaining the reasoning for doing so in detail. 
Hence, even now, Fisher’s (1930) insights are very useful for the examination of the size effect. 
An important point in Fisher’s quote is that the size of the infinite utility stream is perceived as 
“permanently” high or low. The size difference among the utility streams may be perceived as a 
permanently continuing difference of utilities among different utility streams. Anticipation of a 
permanently higher utility may enhance an emotional sense of well-being because people feel 
they are in a long-lasting secure situation, which will generate a positive psychological response 
and make people more patient. If that is true, distant future utilities should be taken into account 
equally with present utility. Otherwise, it is impossible to distinguish whether the difference of 
utilities will continue permanently. 
 From this point of view, the specification that only the present utility influences the 
formation of RTP, as is the case of Uzawa’s model, is inadequate. Instead, a simple measure of 
the size where present and future utilities are summed with equal weight will be a more 
appropriate measure of the size of a utility stream.3 
 
A5.3  Model of RTP4 
A5.3.1  The model 
The representative household solves the maximization problem as shown in Section A1.3. 
Taking the arguments in Section A5.2 into account, the “size” of the infinite utility stream can 
be defined as follows. 
 
Definition 1: The size of the utility stream W for a given technology A is 
 
     
T
t
T
dtcutρEW
0
lim  , 
 
where E is the expectation operator, and 
 
                                                   
3 Das (2003) showed another stable endogenous time preference model with decreasing impatience. Her 
model is stable, although the rate of time preference is decreasing because endogenous impatience is 
almost constant. In this sense, the situation her model describes is very special. 
4 The idea of this type of endogenous time preference model was originally presented in Harashima 
(2004). 
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 
T
tρ
1
  if Tt 0  
                              0tρ   otherwise.    
 
 tρ  indicates weights and has the same value in any period. Thus, the weights for the 
evaluation of future utilities are distributed evenly over time, as discussed in Section A5.2. 
 To this point, technology A has been assumed to be constant. If A is temporally 
variable (At) and grows at a constant rate and the economy is on a balanced growth path such 
that At, yt, kt, and ct grow at the same rate, then the definition of W needs to be modified because 
any stream of ct and u(ct) grows to infinity. It is then impossible to distinguish the sizes of the 
utility stream by simply summing up ct as T  as shown in Definition 1. Because 
balanced growth is possible only when technological progress is Harrod neutral, I assume a 
Harrod neutral production function such that 
 
    1ttt kωAy  , 
 
where  10   and  ωω 0  are constants. To distinguish the sizes of utility stream, 
the following value is set as the standard stream of utility, 
 
   ψtecu ~  , 
 
where  cc ~0~   is a constant and  ψψ 0  is a constant rate of growth. Streams of utility can 
be compared with this standard stream. If a constant relative risk aversion utility function is 
assumed, a stream of utility can be compared with the standard stream of utility as follows: 
 
  
 
   









ψt
t
γγψt
γ
t
ψt
t
e
c
u
c
γ
ec
c
ecu
cu
11
1
~
1
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 . 
 
By using this ratio, a given stream of utility can be distinguished from the standard stream of 
utility. That is, the size of a utility stream W for a given stream of technology At that grows at 
the same rate ψ as yt, kt, and ct can be alternatively defined as 
 
    







T
ψt
t
T
dt
e
c
utρEW
0
lim  . 
 30 
 
Clearly, if ψ = 0, then the size (W) degenerates into the one shown in Definition 1. 
 If there is a steady state such that 
 
       

 cuEcuE t
t
l i m  , 
 
or for the case of expected balanced growth, 
 
    













cuE
e
c
uE
ψt
t
t
lim  , 
 
where c* is a constant and indicates steady-state consumption, then 
 
   cuEW  
 
for the following reason. Because      

 cuEcuE t
t
lim (or 











 ψt
t
t e
c
uElim   cuE ), 
then 
 
            WcuEdtcuEcuEtρT t
T
 
 0lim  
  (or         WcuEdt
e
c
uEcuEtρ
T
ψt
t
T



















 
 0lim ) . 
 
In addition, 
 
         0lim
0



dtcuEcuEtρ
T
t
T
 
  (or      0lim
0






















dt
e
c
uEcuEtρ
T
ψt
t
T
) . 
 
Hence,    cuEW ; that is, RTP is determined by steady-state consumption (c*). 
 The RTP model presented in this paper is constructed on the basis of this measure of 
W. An essential property that must be incorporated into the model is that RTP is sensitive to, and 
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a function of, W such that 
 
   Wθθ   , 
 
where  Wθ   is monotonically continuous and continuously differentiable. Because W is a 
sum of utilities, this property simply reflects the core idea of an endogenous RTP. However, this 
property is new in the sense that RTP is sensitive not only to the present utility but also to the 
entire stream of utility, that is, the size of the utility stream represented by the utility of 
steady-state consumption. This property is intuitively acceptable because it is likely that people 
set their principles or parameters for their behaviors considering the final consequences of their 
behavior (i.e., the steady state; see, e.g., Barsky and Sims, 2012). 
 Another essential property that must be incorporated into the model is 
 
  0
dW
dθ
 . 
 
Because    cuEW  and  
t
t
dc
cdu
0 , RTP is inversely proportionate to c*. This property is 
consistent with the findings in many empirical studies, which have shown that RTP is negatively 
correlated with permanent income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991). 
 In summary, the basic structure of the model is: 
 
         cuEθWθθ  , 
   0 cudE
dθ
dW
dθ
 .                       (A9) 
 
This model is deceptively similar to Uzawa’s endogenous RTP model and simply replaces ct 
with c* and 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  with    0cudE
dθ
. However, the two models are completely different 
because of the opposite characteristics of 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  and    0cudE
dθ
. 
 
A5.3.2  Nature of the model 
The model can be regarded as successful only if it exhibits stability. In Uzawa’s model, the 
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economy becomes unstable if 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  is replaced with 
 
0
t
t
cdu
dθ
. In this section, I 
examine the stability of the model. 
 
A5.3.2.1  Equilibrium RTP 
In Ramsey-type models, such as shown in Section A1.3, if a constant RTP is given, the value of 
the marginal product of capital (i.e., the value of the real interest rate) converges to that of the 
given RTP as the economy approaches the steady state. Hence, when a RTP is specified at a 
certain value, the corresponding expected steady-state consumption is uniquely determined. 
Given fixed values of other exogenous parameters, any predetermined RTP has unique values of 
expected consumption and utility at steady state. There is a one-to-one correspondence between 
the expected utilities at steady state and the RTPs; therefore, the expected utility at steady state 
can be expressed as a function of RTP. Let 

xc  be a set of steady-state consumption levels, 
given a set of RTPs (θx) and other fixed exogenous parameters. The concept of θ → W 
discussed above can be described as 
 
     WcuEθg    ,                      (A10) 
 
where  xcc  and xθθ . On the other hand, RTP is a continuous function of steady-state 
consumption as shown in equation (A9) such that        cuEθWθθ . The 
reverse function is 
 
     WcuEθh    .                       (A11) 
 
 The equilibrium RTP is determined by the point of intersection of the two functions, 
 θg  and  θh , as shown in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the special but conventionally 
assumed case for  θh  in which θ is not sensitive to W, and RTP is constant. There exists a 
point of intersection because both  θg  and  θh  are monotonically continuous for 0θ . 
 θh  is monotonically continuous because  Wθ   is monotonically continuous.  θg  is 
monotonically continuous because, as a result of utility maximization,    k fc  and 
 



dk
kdf 
 θ , where 
k  is capital input per capita at steady state such that  t
t
kk

  lim . 
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Because  k f  and  


dk
kdf 
 are monotonically continuous for 0k , c* is a 
monotonically continuous function of θ for 0θ . Here, because u is monotonically 
continuous, then     θgcuE   is also monotonically continuous for 0θ . 
 The function      WcuEθg    is a decreasing function of θ because higher RTP 
results in lower steady state consumption. The function      WcuEθh    is also a 
decreasing function of θ because 0
dW
dθ
. Thus, both  θg  and  θh  are decreasing, but 
the slope of  θh  is steeper than that of  θg  as shown in Figure 1. This is true because 
  Wθg  is the consequence of a Ramsey-type model as shown in Section A1.3; thus, if 
θ , then   0Wθg  because  tiθ  and 0tk , and if 0θ , then 
  Wθg  because 0 tiθ  and tk . The function   Wθh  indicates the 
endogeneity of RTP, and because RTP is usually neither zero nor infinity, then even if 
  0Wθh , θ , and   Wθh , θ0 . Hence, the locus   Wθh  cuts the 
locus   Wθg   downward from the top, as shown in Figure 1. Hence, the locus   Wθh   
is more vertical than   Wθg  , and thereby  a permanently constant RTP, as shown in Figure 
2, has probably been used as an approximation of the locus   Wθh  for simplicity.  
 
A5.3.2.2  Stability of the model 
RTP is constant unless a shock that changes the expected c* occurs because W does not depend 
on t but on the expected c*. Thus, the same RTP and steady state continue until such a shock 
hits the economy. Therefore, the endogeneity of RTP only matters when a shock occurs. This 
constancy is the key for the stability of the model. Once the RTP corresponding to the 
intersection (Fig. 1) is determined, it is constant and the economy converges at a unique steady 
state unless a shock that changes the expected c* occurs. The shock is exogenous to the model, 
and the economy does not explode endogenously but stabilizes at the steady state. Hence, the 
property 0
dW
dθ
 in the model, which is consistent with empirical findings, does not cause 
instability. 
 The model is therefore acceptable as a model of endogenous RTP. Furthermore, 
because RTP is endogenously determined, the assumption of irrationality is not necessary for 
the determination of RTP. Nevertheless, a shock on RTP can be initiated by a shock on the 
expected c*; thus, even if the so-called animal spirits are directly irrelevant to determination of 
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RTP, they may be relevant in the generation of shocks on the expected c*. 
 
A6  FREQUENT RTP SHOCKS 
A6.1  Difficulty in knowing RTP RH  
To estimate the parameter values of equation (A11) in the structural model of RTP RH, it is 
necessary to obtain a sufficiently large amount of data on the value of RTP RH. To obtain these 
data, a household must know the RTPs of all the other households. Although a household knows 
its own RTP, it has almost no information about the RTPs of all the other households much less 
time-series data on each household’s RTP. Because of the lack of available data, a household 
cannot estimate the parameter values in equation (A11) in the structural model of RTP RH even 
if it knows the functional forms of equations in the structural model.  
We can easily generate data on aggregate consumption, investment, production, 
inflation, trade, and other factors at a relatively low cost, but we cannot directly observe the 
value of RTP RH. Nonetheless, many estimates of RTP have been reported, but they are not 
based on a structural model of RTP. Most are the results of experimental studies or indirect 
estimates based on other models (e.g., Ramsey growth models) on the assumption that RTP is 
constant. Experiments can give us some information on the RTPs of test subjects, but we should 
not naively use these estimates as the RTP RH in the calculation of the future path of economy 
because they vary widely according to the experimental environments. Furthermore, most of the 
indirect estimates were calculated on the assumption that RTP is constant, which as discussed 
previously, is most likely not the case. The basic problem is that no credible estimation method 
of RTP RH has been established. 
 
A6.2  Expectations based on beliefs 
The lack of observable data on RTP RH will significantly hinder households from generating 
rational expectations of the future path of economy. How do households rationally expect their 
future streams of consumption and production and calculate their optimal paths without 
information on RTP RH, which is indispensable as the discount factor? The historical mean of 
RTP RH estimated by long-term data is not consistent with a rational expectation of the future 
stream because RTP is not constant. Without a reliable method for estimating the parameters of 
the structural model, it is impossible for households to generate rational expectations of the 
future path of the economy. 
 An alternative way of estimating expected values of RTP RH is needed, but even if an 
alternative method is utilized, households still have to behave as rationally as possible even in 
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an environment of significantly incomplete information. In this situation, household may have 
to use the concept of bounded rationality to make decisions. It is possible that the only 
alternative for a household is to use its “belief” about the RTP RH. The use of a belief does not 
mean that households deviate from rationality; rather, it is the most rational behavior they can 
use in an environment where insufficient information is available. 
 Such a belief is defined in this paper as the range of values of RTP RH within which a 
household believes that the true RTP RH exists. Households utilize the belief in place of 
equation (A11). More specifically, suppose that household i ( Ni ) believes that the RTP RH 
in the future is situated in the range λi, where the subjective probability density at any point on λi 
is identical (i.e., its distribution shape is uniform). Because households have no information 
about the shape of the distribution, they assume that it is uniform. This supposition means that 
household i believes that λi is stationary. Let iλ be the mean of λi. Suppose that household i 
calculates its optimal future path on the belief that the mean of future values of RTP RH is
iλ . 
By equation (A10), W can be calculated based on 
iλ , and the expected future path of economy 
can be calculated. 
 Households can equally access all relevant information. Therefore, if the belief of a 
household is very different from those of the majority, the household will soon perceive that its 
belief is different, through observing the behavior of majority. The household will change its 
belief to the almost same as those of the majority because otherwise it cannot achieve optimality 
as expected on the assumption that sustainable heterogeneity is achieved. Hence, it is likely that 
households’ beliefs become similar, and thereby, it is assumed for simplicity that households’ 
beliefs are identical.  
 Note that households do not cooperatively and collectively expect the future path of 
economy (i.e., the representative household’s future path), but each household independently 
and individually generates its own expectations based on its belief in RTP RH. The household 
thereby creates its own expected future path considering the expected representative 
household’s future path. The aggregates are the sum of all household’s independent and 
individual activities, but if sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, the aggregates appear to be the 
same as the results of the representative household’s activities. 
 
A6.3  Refining beliefs 
A household knows that its expectation is based on its beliefs and not the structural model. 
Therefore, it will always want to refine the belief, that is, raise the probability that the belief is 
the correct value, by exploiting all currently available relevant information. Let a set of 
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currently available economic indicators be It (e.g., the observed data on consumption, 
production, inventory, etc.). These data may provide some useful information on the past RTP 
RH, and a household may refine its belief based on this information. These data and equation 
(A10) can be used to generate estimates of past values of RTP RH. However, It includes noise, 
and data in It will usually be somewhat inconsistent between the elements of It. In addition, 
because equation (A10) indicates the steady state values that are achieved after a long-period 
transition, the short-term past data included in It are basically insufficient to obtain a credible 
estimate. Therefore, the estimate of the past values of RTP RH based on It and equation (A10) 
will usually have a large confidence interval. Let 
Iμ  be the estimated past RTP RH and μI be 
its confidence interval of, for example, 95%. Because households can equally access all relevant 
information, assume for simplicity that μI and Iμ are identical for all households. 
 Although a household knows that 
Iμ  is not a credible estimate, has a large 
confidence interval, and is merely an estimate (usually a point estimate) of a past value, it will 
strive to utilize the information derived from
Iμ to refine its beliefs in the future value of RTP 
RH. Usually
Iμ will not be equal to iλ , but the ranges of λi and μI may partly overlap. Household 
i may utilize the information from this partial overlap to refine its belief (i.e., information of 
how λi is different from μI). iI λμ   indicates that the belief iλ  is wrong, Iμ is wrong, both 
are wrong, or both are right if the true past RTP RH is
Iμ but the true future RTP RH is iλ . The 
belief 
iλ  may be wrong because the RTP RH will change in the near future, and Iμ may be 
wrong because the RTP RH changed during the period in which the data were obtained. In 
addition, a household knows that μI is the result of all households’ activities based on their 
beliefs, not on the true value of RTP RH. These uncertainties arise because households cannot 
know the parameters of the structural model. Without using the structural model, household i 
cannot judge whether 
iλ  is wrong, Iμ is wrong, both are wrong, or both are right. As a result, 
household i will not easily adjust its belief from 
iλ  to Iμ . 
 However, it is still likely that information about the difference between λi and μI can be 
used to refine the belief. To extract the useful information, the following rules may be used:  
 
Rule 1: if 
Iμ is included in λi, the belief is not adjusted; otherwise, the belief is adjusted from 
iλ  to Iμ . 
Rule 2: if 
iλ is included in μI, the belief is not adjusted; otherwise, the belief is adjusted from 
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iλ  to Iμ . 
Rule 3: if λi and μI overlap at or above a specified ratio, the belief is not adjusted; otherwise, the 
belief is adjusted from 
iλ  to Iμ . 
 
The above rules may be seen as a type of adaptive expectation because μI indicates the past RTP 
RH. However, in the situation where the parameters of the structural model of the RTP RH are 
unknown, it may be seen as rational to utilize the information contained in μI by adopting one of 
these rules. 
 
A6.4  Changing beliefs 
However, it does not seem likely that a household will refine its belief following one of the rules 
shown above because the rules are basically backward looking and will not be adopted as a tool 
for refining the belief if a household is convinced that the RTP RH is temporally variable. The 
belief will only be changed if forward-looking information is available, that is, when a 
household becomes aware of information about the future RTP RH in μI. For example, the 
difference between λi and μI may reflect an unexpected and large positive technology shock that 
occurred after the formation of belief λi. Because the effects of the technology shock will persist 
for long periods in the future, household i will most likely change its belief. In this case, a 
household will not simply refine its belief from 
iλ  to Iμ ; it will change to another value that 
is formed as an entirely new belief. 
 Whether a household changes its belief or not, therefore, will depend not simply on μI 
but on the information the household can extract from μI about the future path of the economy. 
Hence, in some cases, a household will change its belief when new values of μI are obtained, but 
in other cases, it will not, depending on how the household interprets the information contained 
in μI. 
 
A6.5  Heuristics 
When a household interprets μI, it may also use heuristic methods, for example, a simplified 
linear reduced form model of RTP RH. Studies of the use of heuristics and bounded rationality 
in this context would be useful for better understanding the interpretation mechanism of μI. 
There are many possible simplified linear reduced form models of RH’s RTP that could be used 
as heuristic methods although most of them may be ad hoc. Even though such reduced form 
models are far less credible than a structural model, they may be utilized as a heuristic method 
of interpreting μI by households. Although these types of models may often result in misleading 
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conclusions, they may sometimes provide useful information. For example, if a linear 
correlation between RTP RH and a financial indicator exists, even if it is weak or temporary, 
changes in the financial indicator may contain useful information about changes in the RTP RH. 
Therefore, if a household believes that this correlation exists, it will use this information to 
interpret μI. 
 
A6.6  Frequent RTP shocks 
Households must have expected values of RTP RH for sustainable heterogeneity, but as 
previously discussed, the expectations are not based on the structural model but rather on a 
belief that is not guaranteed to generate the correct value. In addition, the belief can be 
influenced by heuristic considerations. These features indicate that the expected values of RTP 
RH will fluctuate more frequently than the intrinsic RTP RH. 
 Households’ expectations of RTP RH will change when the intrinsic RTP RH shifts, 
for example, when new information about shocks on the factors that determine equation (A10) 
becomes available. For a given θ,   cuE changes if the expectation of future productivity 
changes. Productivity at the macro level will be influenced by scientific technology, financial 
technology, social infrastructure, and other factors. If expectations about these factors in the 
future changes, the expected future productivity and   cuE will also change. In addition, 
even if intrinsic RTP RH does not change, the expected RTP RH will change if a household’s 
belief is altered because of new information contained in μI. Hence, the expected RTP RH can 
change independently of intrinsic changes in RTP RH. Therefore, even if intrinsic changes in 
RTP RH occur infrequently, changes in the expected RTP RH may occur more frequently. 
 A household’s expected RTP RH can potentially change every time new information 
on μI becomes available if it contains the information that makes beliefs change. Information 
concerning factors that affect the expected RTP RH will become available frequently, and at 
least some of the information may be both very important and unexpected. In addition, there 
will be many disturbances in the fundamental factors that affect equation (A10), and many of 
these disturbances will also cause μI to change. As discussed previously, a household may 
interpret these changes in μI as a change in the true RTP RH. Therefore, it is likely that 
households’ expected RTP RH change more frequently than the intrinsic RTP RH, and thereby, 
that time preference shocks also occur more frequently than previously thought. 
 Even a small piece of additional information about the belief can significantly change 
the path of the economy. For example, if many households believe a rumor (whether it is true or 
not) related to information about the interpretation of μI and respond similarly to it, their 
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expectations will be changed in the same direction by the rumor. If all households respond 
similarly to an untrue rumor and change their expectations equally to an untrue value, the 
economy will proceed based on the incorrect expectation of RTP RH. The
Iμ that is observed a 
few periods later will follow these wrongly expected values of RTP RH. Upon obtaining new 
data of 
Iμ that are consistent with these wrongly expected values, households will judge that 
their (incorrect) changes were in fact correct. As a result, the incorrect expectations become 
self-fulfilling. This spurious situation may reach an impasse at some point in the future because 
the expectations are based not on a structural model but on the (incorrect) beliefs. Households 
will not anticipate the impasse until the economy reaches it because they believe that the 
wrongly expected RTP RH (i.e., the currently held belief) is true. 
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Figure 1: A payoff curve 
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Figure 2: Payoff curves for different initial costs 
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